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DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CANADIAN AND U.S. FEDERAL
SYSTEMS - RESULTING EFFECTS ON THE ABILITY TO
DEAL WITH CROSS-BORDER AND INTERNATIONAL
ISSUES
Daniel Farber*

I was asked to address the question of how U.S. Federalism impacts the
implementation of border agreements. Just so I do not leave you in suspense,
I will begin by giving you my answer. Ten years ago, I would have said the
answer to the question of how federalism impacts the implementation of
border agreements was "not at all," that federalism presents no barrier to
implementation of any conceivable agreement that might be reached with
another country. Now my answer would be a little bit different than ten
years ago. There are some (at this point, relatively confined) areas where
federalism could be a problem, although I think, as a practical matter, not a
severe one. We are in a state of transition in the U.S. in our thinking about
federalism; and it is not clear where we are going. It is not clear whether the
last ten years are the beginning of a massive shift, or merely a small blip.
The text of the U.S. Constitution, as it bears on federalism, has been
essentially unchanged in the most important respects for two hundred years.
The most significant changes were the Civil War amendments, which
increased the federal government's authority in the area of civil liberties and
civil rights. Although the text otherwise is now largely what it was 200 years
ago, there have been dramatic changes in constitutional doctrine and in the
scope of the federal government.' (Intriguingly, courts have played similarly
fast and loose with the constitutional text in Canada, but in the opposite
Farber bio.
the U.S. Constitution, the Canadian Constitution assigns only a few specific

1 Unlike

limited powers to the provinces, leaving the residuum of power to the federal government. In
the wake of the American Civil War, the drafters of the Canadian Constitution intended to
create a more centralized system than the United States's. See 1 Peter W. Hogg,
Constitutional Law of Canada § 5.3 at 5-14 B 5-15. (loose-leafed.) For example, the federal
government was given the power to appoint provincial judges and lieutenant governors (quite
contrary to our own Supreme Court's anti-commandeering doctrine). Nevertheless, the courts
were hostile to federal power, which they restricted sharply while aggressively expanding
provincial powers. See Hogg, supra, at 5-16 - 5-18; L. Kinvin Wroth, Notes for a
ComparativeStudy of the Origins of Federalismin the United States and Canada, 15 Ariz. J.
Int'l & Comp. L. 93, 117-21 (1998).
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digress direction, by creatively limiting the federal governments.) Given our
time limitations this morning, I will not take you on a complete guided tour
of U.S. Constitutional history. Instead, let me oversimplify by dividing
history in half, with 1937 as the dividing point.
This division is a gross oversimplification, but it does seem clear that
there was a historic change in 1937. Before 1937, the activities of the federal
government were still relatively small, and the courts were relatively active
in policing the boundaries of federalism. An extreme case from the 1890's,
which epitomizes the era was United States v. E.C. Knight.2 The issue was
whether the Sherman Act, the U.S. anti-trust law, could be applied to a
company that had acquired ninety-eight percent of the sugar manufacturing
capacity in the United States. In essence, the Supreme Court said, "No,
Congress has the ability to regulate interstate commerce, but manufacturing
is not commerce. Manufacturing occurs before commerce takes place."
Therefore, the existence of a nationwide monopoly was not a sufficient
predicate for federal intervention. Thus, the courts in this time period tried to
distinguish between commerce on the one hand, and manufacturing,
agriculture, and mining, on the other hand. Labor relations tend to be put on
the non-commerce side of that divide, so that congressional efforts to deal
with minimum wages or labor unions or similar issues were subject to
resistance by the courts.3
The result was a collision between the government and the Supreme
Court over the New Deal. Franklin Roosevelt's efforts to pass major new
federal legislation ran into a stubborn Supreme Court majority intent on
maintaining traditional divisions of authority between the federal and state
government. The outcome of this head-on collision was a retreat by the
Supreme Court.4 (In Canada, there was apparently a similar collision
between the federal legislature and the Privy Council, but the Privy Council
stood its ground.)5 After 1937 we see much different views of federalism.
For the next fifty or sixty years, the Supreme Court seemed relatively
uninterested in limiting federal power. For example, by the 1960's we find
the Supreme Court upholding the use of the commerce clause, as a basis for
civil rights legislation dealing with discrimination against blacks in hotels

2

20.2(a).

156 U.S. 1 (1895). For the parallel Canadian decisions, see Hogg, supra note
1, at §

3 See Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton
Rd., 295 U.S. 330 (1935); Hammer v.
Dagehart(The Child Labor Case), 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
For an overview of recent appraisals of this constitutional crisis by historians, see
Daniel A. Farber, Who Killed Lochner?, _ Geo. L.J. (2002).
5 See Hogg, supra note 1, at
§ 17.4(a).
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and restaurants and in employment. 6 This nationwide anti-discrimination
legislation based on the commerce clause was upheld by the Court with very
little difficulty in a way that would have been utterly shocking to judges
before 1937.
These dramatic changes in judicial doctrine have taken place without
getting corresponding changes in the text. The text has, perhaps, set the
contours of the debate, but it has not had a controlling influence on the
outcomes. In the U.S. we have seen the Supreme Court, especially in the last
fifty or sixty years, taking a Constitution that supposedly gave only limited
powers to the federal government, and over time expanding its interpretation
of those powers, until they nearly seemed to cover the universe of regulatory
activity. Canadians should not be shocked by this: their courts have taken a
constitution designed to create a more centralized government than ours, and
7
turned it into a weaker one.
With the remainder of my time, I would like first to tell you a little bit
more about this post 1937 consensus, and its application to border
agreements. Second, I want to talk about the cracks in the consensus that
have recently appeared. Third, I want to speculate very briefly about the
future.
In order to understand the post-World War II consensus and how it came
about, you need to know more about the situation as of 1937. I told you
about the division the courts made between manufacturing and agriculture on
the one hand, which were considered to be state concerns, and interstate
commerce-interstate trade and interstate sales on the other hand, which
were federal concerns. The picture was not quite that simple. There were
some exceptions in which the court had allowed the federal government to
regulate what were essentially non-interstate transactions.
One exception involved what was called the stream of commerce. For
example, a slaughterhouse in Chicago brought cattle in from the American
west, slaughtered the animals, and shipped the meat out all over the country."
The Supreme Court said the slaughterhouse was subject to federal regulation
even though the slaughterhouse company itself did not engage in interstate
transportation and its slaughtering activities were not themselves interstate.
6 See Heartof Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. UnitedStates, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v.

McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
7 The evolution of Canadian law is especially interesting given the broad powers
seemingly bestowed on the federal government, such as the power "to make laws for the
peace, order, and good government of Canada," a power that has been construed very
narrowly. See Hogg, supra note 1, chapter 17. Notably, some areas that the U.S. Supreme
Court views as the core of state authority, such as criminal law, are exclusively federal in
Canada. See Hogg, supra note 1, at 18.
8 Switft & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905).
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The local activities of the slaughterhouse were subject to federal regulation
because of their role in the stream of commerce.
Another important exception related to the channels of commerce.
Congress could regulate what passed through interstate commerce even
though the effect of regulation was to control local activities. For example,
Congress could ban interstate transportation of lottery tickets, in order to
keep interstate commerce pure from these corrupting items. 9 The only
purpose of this ban was to affect people buying tickets at a local level. There
was nothing wrong with the tickets themselves. There was no physical
danger or even moral danger in the actual transportation of tickets. The goal
of this ban was to protect popular morals, which is generally a state rather
than federal concern.
A third exception was for events that "directly affected" commerce.
Even if an activity by itself was not interstate, if it had an immediate or clear
effect on interstate commerce, Congress might be able to act.'0
Before 1937, there was enough resistance to keep these exceptions
narrow. What happened after 1937 was that the exceptions swallowed up the
rule. By the early 1940's, we had Wickard v. Filburn." This is a case where
a farmer grew wheat to feed livestock on his own farm. The question was
whether congressional statutes regulating the wheat industry could be applied
to him. This was purely a local activity-the farmer was not shipping
anything in interstate commerce-but the Court said the effect of this kind of
use of grain by all farmers was substantial enough that, taken altogether, it
had an effect on interstate grain prices and on supply and demand for wheat.
Therefore, Congress had the power to regulate the local activities of this
wheat fanner. Using that kind of reasoning as a predicate the Court was able
to in the 1960's to uphold the Civil Rights legislation that I mentioned
earlier. 12
I have been focusing on the commerce clause because that is the most
important of congressional powers, but in the post-war period, other
congressional powers were also very broadly construed. The spending
clause-the power to spend money and to attach conditions to the fundsprovides Congress with great leverage. The federal government can
accomplish all kinds of things either by subsidizing activities or by attaching
9

See Champion v. Ames (The Lottery Case), 188 U.S. 321 (1903).

10 See Houston, E.& W. Tex. Ry. v. United States (The Shreveport Rate Case), 234 U.S.

342 (1914).

11317 U.S. 111 (1942).

Similarly broad views of the commerce power were taken in other cases such as
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971), and Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
ReclamationAss'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
12
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conditions to other kinds of financing. The Court has been very tolerant in
terms of the object of the spending, in terms of what kinds of projects could
be subsidized and in giving Congress a great deal of leeway to attach
conditions to the money.13
In foreign affairs, the view was essentially that the federal government
had complete control of foreign affairs. 4 The states were largely excluded
from anything relating to foreign affairs. States' rights were not a
consideration when Congress and the President were dealing with
international affairs. Similarly, in the area of Civil Rights, building on both
the Commerce Clause and on the Civil War amendments, the U.S. Supreme
Court also save Congress leeway to attack various kinds of discrimination
and to protect individual rights.'5
All of that is in the nature of a large historical introduction. Let me talk
briefly about what has been happening recently, mostly since 1990 or so.
Academics fired the early shots in attacking the post-New Deal
consensus. For example, Richard Epstein of the University of Chicago, a
well-known libertarian scholar, has argued that the post-1937 laws are just
wrong." He argues that the Court had it right before 1937, with those
distinctions between manufacturing and agriculture on the one hand and
commerce on the other hand. In Epstein's view, the Court should return to
these distinctions. This means that a great deal of the federal labor
legislation, anti-discrimination legislation and environmental legislation that
we have seen for the past fifty or sixty years, would all be unconstitutional.
There have also been attacks by other scholars on the breadth of the foreign
affairs and treaty powers. Scholars have argued that the Congress and the
President should not be able to use the treaty power as a way of overriding
the autonomy of the individual
states and that states rights should continue to
7
play some role in that area.'
'3

See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).

14 See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) (foreign

affairs is inherent aspect of national power); Missouri v. Holland,252 U.S. 416 (1920) (Tenth
Amendment does not limit treaty power).
15 In addition to the cases cited in note 6 supra, see City of Rome
v. United States, 446
U.S. 156 (1980); South Carolinav. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966); Katzenbach v. Morgan,
384 U.S. 641 (1966).
16 Richard Epstein, The ProperScope of the Commerce
Power, 73 Va. L. Rev. 1387
(1987). See also Randy E. Barnett, The OriginalMeaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 101 (2001).
17 For discussion of the revisionist states' rights view of the treaty
power, see David
Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historic Foundations of the Nationalist
Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 101 (2000); Curtis Bradley, The Treaty
Power and American Federalism,97 Mich. L. Rev. 391 (1998).
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The first sign that the courts might be responsive to some of these
arguments involved issues of state immunity. These issues arise when
Congress is regulates state governmental activities, requires state officials to
assist in implementing federal law, or allows law suits against the states for
damages.
In 1976, the Court recognized some degree of immunity of state activities
from federal regulation when it struck down the application of the federal
minimum wage law to state employees.'8 Now, that particular innovation did
not last. The U.S. Supreme Court pulled back and has not pursued that line
of attack on federal power, but has been very active in two related areas. 19
First, the Court has been active in the area of damage immunities for
states. The Court has been very vigilant about protecting the states from
liability for damages under federal law. 20 For example, a couple of years ago
the Court held that states could not be sued for infringing patents or
copyrights or other intellectual property rights. 2' Although the states are not
involved in a very major way in utilizing intellectual property, it is still a
ruling that is of concern to other countries and to foreign firms.
Second, the Court has taken a very firm stand concerning the federal
government's ability to use state officials for implementation purposes,
something that the Court refers to as commandeering. The Court has said
this is simply not permissible, even in cases where it seems to be quite
innocuous.22 For example, the Brady Act required local sheriffs to do
minimal background checks on individuals who were purchasing guns. The
U.S. Supreme Court said this violated the sacred principle of state autonomy
by essentially drafting state officials as if they were mere foot soldiers in the
federal bureaucracy. 23
These cases could be considered exceptional because they involve direct
action of the federal government against state governments. What was more
8 NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
19 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985)

(overruling National League of Cities). Somewhat surprisingly, Garcia has survived
unscathed and nearly unquestioned for fifteen years during which the conservative majority
has been
20 actively pursuing a states' rights agenda.
See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida,517 U.S. 44 (1996).
21 College Savings Bank v. Florida PrepaidPostsecondaryExpense Board, 527 U.S.
666 (1999).
22 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). So eager was the Court to
emphasize this rule that it insisted that not even a compelling federal interest could justify
commandeering. It is a little hard to take seriously, however, the notion that the Court would
countenance a major threat to national security or public health if commandeering were the
only feasible
solution.
23
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 98 (1997).
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surprising was when the Court began reducing the federal government's
power to regulate private individuals. For the first time since 1937, the U.S.
Supreme Court has found in two recent cases that Congress went too far,
exceeding the boundaries of its powers under the Interstate Commerce
Clause. In both of these cases, the Court stressed the involvement of noncommercial activity.
The first case was United States v. Lopez.24 Lopez struck down a federal
law that prohibited carrying guns within one thousand feet of a school.25 The
second case involved the Violence Against Women Act.2' The Violence
Against Women Act created a federal remedy for gender-motivated violence
against women. The Court said, essentially, that it was one thing to expand
the Commerce Clause to cover the whole economy but they had to draw a
line somewhere. They were going to draw a line short of this kind of
legislation, which touched on issues of criminal law that are historically in
the U.S. (unlike Canada) the concern of the state governments. 27
The big question then is how far is the Court going to go? Is the
conservative majority just nibbling around the edges of federal power, or is
this the beginning of a counter-revolution? The only honest answer is we do
not know.
Justice Thomas has adopted large chunks of Richard Epstein's position.
He would like, if not to undo the New Deal, at least to roll back twenty or
thirty years of more recent federal legislation by construing federal powers
narrowly. It is not clear whether he has any other real supporters. My
impression is that the other conservative Justices who have been the majority
in these cases do not see themselves as rolling back established federal
authority. They see themselves as holding the line. They see that the federal
government expanded greatly after 1937 and that a new kind of equilibrium
was reached. Under the new equilibrium, they seem to think, the federal
government had power over economic transactions, but only recently has
Congress tried to push beyond regulating economic transactions into social
areas. The U.S. Supreme Court is trying to resist this trend, but not to
challenge federal control of the economy. That, at least, is my interpretation
of the situation.2
The future depends a great deal on judicial appointments. We do not
know who is going to be appointed to the Court over the next several years or
514 U.S. 549 (1995).
Gun Free School Zone Act 18 U.S.C. § 922 (q)(1)(A)(1990).
26 Violence Against Women Act 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).
27 UnitedStates v. Morrison529 U.S. 598 (2000).
See Daniel A. Farber, Pledging a New Alliance: An Essay on Sovereignty and the
New Federalism,75 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1133 (2000).
24

18
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how strongly they will feel about these issues. Nevertheless, I doubt we will
go back to 1937 in this area of the law. The Humpty Dumpty of states' rights
has fallen off the wall; and I doubt the Supreme Court can put it together
again.
Let me just wrap up very quickly. As I said at the beginning, federalism
is clearly not a major problem in border relations. Ten years ago, it was a
very small problem. Now, within some limited areas where state government
is directly involved, federalism is always a potential issue that could at least
prompt litigation. For example, requiring the states to actively administer
border agreements may be problematic under current law.
As to what the future will hold in the longer run, I think I will take refuge
in probabilities, like the weather forecasters. In terms of the future of federal
power, I would say that my forecast is sixty percent probability of scattered
clouds, forty percent probability of some rain, and a slight chance of high
winds, lightning and hail damage.

